

# *disconnected histories*



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**Papers**

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## “Dissonance in the Concert of Nations: How the Failure of International Cooperation Caused the First Global Crash”

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On June 21, 1982, during the twelfth FIFA Men’s World Cup in Spain, a soccer match between Kuwait and France took a dark turn and changed the history of sports arbitration. France was already leading 3–1 when midfielder Alain Giresse scored the fourth goal. No Kuwaiti player stood in the way: The entire team had stalled for a second after hearing a whistle from the crowd, which they misinterpreted as a whistle from Soviet referee Miroslav Stupar. The Kuwaiti team disputed the validity of the goal and stopped playing in protest. The president of the Kuwaiti football federation, Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Prince of Kuwait and brother of the Emir, rushed onto the field to talk to the referee and contest the score.

To the astonishment of the world audience, Stupar granted Fahad’s request and disallowed the goal.<sup>1</sup> This decision blatantly violated the rules of soccer. On that day, discretionary power distorted institutional authority. Regardless of whether the officiating of the game was legitimate or not, outside pressure jeopardized the status and function of the referee. The intrusion of a third-party body shattered the imaginary boundaries of the game, which is collectively accepted as an action limited in time and space and follows certain premises. Sporting rules are inherent in the nature of each sport: they are not subject to deliberation in their application. They cannot be developed further (or only within insignificant confines). They form a boundary that fundamentally defines the game: If the circumference of a ball or the length of a field changes, baseball becomes softball, squash becomes racquetball, or field hockey becomes lacrosse. Within these defining boundaries, everything is at stake. The Sheikh’s intervention was a negation of the game, a break in the voluntary illusion of self-regulation. It was a symptom of a changing world in which new kinds of illiberal market practices disrupted the international diplomatic and financial order that had prevailed since World War II.<sup>2</sup>

In 1987, the international arbiters in the transnational trade and finance game were freely floating exchange rates; and the disruptive element in the match was U.S. Treasury Secretary James A. Baker.

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<sup>1</sup> Roger I. Abrams, (2013), *Playing Tough: The World of Sports and Politics*, Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 108.

<sup>2</sup> On October 16, 1973, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) artificially raised the price of the barrel by 70% by declaring an oil embargo. This decision gave unprecedented economic and geopolitical power to micro-states that had been completely overlooked so far on the international scene. The OPEC, created in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, formed an international cartel to influence global oil prices that were originally controlled by the “Seven Sisters”: the biggest multinational oil companies, such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now BP), Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California (now Chevron), Texaco (that merged later with Chevron), Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso/Exxon), and Standard Oil Company of New York (Socony, now part of ExxonMobil). These renewed geopolitics and military distribution of power highly influenced the features of financial globalization in the 1970s and 1980s. See Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, (2005), *The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An Introduction*, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group; David Hammes and Douglas Wills, (2005), “Black Gold. The End of Bretton Woods and the Oil-Price Shocks of the 1970s,” *The Independent Review*, IX (4): 501-511.

Since the late-August peak in 1987, the Dow Jones had been declining, and Baker felt entrusted with the mission to calm the markets. At a press conference on October 15, he reiterated that the U.S. economy was not on the verge of recession, but blamed its competitors for defending their unfair competitive advantage through their weak currencies.<sup>3</sup> The West German Bundesbank had just raised interest rates; in response, Baker threatened to devalue the dollar against the deutschmark.<sup>4</sup> German officials and financiers accused him of using “a lower dollar as a threat or a weapon against other nations.”<sup>5</sup> Baker’s statement was the last straw for the markets: it blew up the fragile geopolitical monetary equilibrium. Stock prices fell immediately on Friday, October 16, and tensions intensified over the weekend.

While the crash seemed unrelated to economic fundamentals, exchange rates did respond to macroeconomic and geopolitical news. U.S. trade deficits, which exceeded \$100 billion, widened in the mid-1980s as domestic savings declined and structural budget deficits increased.<sup>6</sup> International investors saw the U.S. economy as a house of cards on the brink of collapse: the trade deficit had become a source of fundamental risk to the economy that no amount of premium could offset.<sup>7</sup> The persistent imbalance required active multilateral cooperation among OECD countries to coordinate macroeconomic and exchange rate policies: The Plaza Accord of 1985, the Tokyo Economic Summit Meeting of May 1986, the Louvre Accord of February 1987, the Venice Summit of June 1987, and the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in September 1987 all envisioned ever closer cooperation, even though the decisions taken often seemed to be in stark contradiction from one summit to the next.<sup>8</sup>

James A. Baker’s threat to unilaterally devalue the dollar after two years of trying to coordinate exchange rates at the global level reflected the failure of multilateral cooperation and the high level of transnational interdependence. The trigger for the October 1987 crash was geopolitical in nature and clarified the crucial role of overlooked actors. Although Baker’s declaration primarily targeted the deutschmark and the yen, other currencies were also affected. The Hong Kong dollar depreciated immediately,<sup>9</sup> as did the currencies of Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Michael E. Porter’s bestseller, *Competitive Advantage* had just been published and epitomized the belligerent vision of global geostrategy as the extension of business competition. See Michael E. Porter, (1985), *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance*, New York: Free Press.

<sup>4</sup> Peter T. Kilborn, “U.S. Said to Allow Decline of Dollar against the Mark,” *The New York Times*, October 18, 1987.

<sup>5</sup> Hermann Remsperger, chief economist at the BHF-Bank, quoted in Serge Schmemmann, “West Germans Irritated by Baker’s Rate Stance,” *The New York Times*, October 17, 1987.

<sup>6</sup> Paul Krugman, (1990), *The Age of Diminishing Expectations*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. See also the shock for the public opinion when the trade deficit hit the first record high in 1984: Peter T. Kilborn, “U.S. Trade Deficit Set Record in 1984,” *The New York Times*, January 31, 1985.

<sup>7</sup> Raj Aggarwal and David C. Schirm, (1992), “Balance of Trade Announcements and Asset Prices: Influence on Equity Prices, Exchange Rates, and Interest Rates,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 11 (1): 80-95.

<sup>8</sup> Martin Feldstein, (1988), “Rethinking International Economic Coordination,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, 40 (2): 205-219; Harold James, (1996), “The Fading or Maturing of Cooperation?” in *International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods*, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>9</sup> Bank of England, Historical Charts of U.S. Dollar to Hong Kong Dollar Spot Exchange Rates for 1987: <https://www.poundsterlinglive.com/bank-of-england-spot/historical-spot-exchange-rates/usd/USD-to-HKD-1987>

<sup>10</sup> Mexico was the only country whose currency did not appreciate against the dollar during the months preceding the crash.

The resort to currency “wars” and adjustments was nothing new in the 1980s.<sup>11</sup> Non-economic circumstances often triggered “surprise” devaluations.<sup>12</sup> The crash appeared to be precipitated by rising long-term interest rates caused by market expectations of a falling dollar, which convinced investors that exchange rates were out of sync with market fundamentals. The focus of the literature and institutional studies on the crash on U.S. monetary policy and its impact on financial markets obscured the multipolar dimension of this power play.<sup>13</sup> The role attributed to the United States was consistent with the belief that the stability and soundness of the global financial equilibrium rested on the New York Stock Exchange, following the spread model of the 1929 crash. Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist George Soros immediately interpreted the October 1987 collapse in terms of a geographic shift in power relative to 1929:

“The most compelling similarity between the crash of 1929 and the crash of 1987 ... is that both incidents revealed a historic ongoing transfer of financial and economic power in the world economy. In 1929 the United States was superseding Great Britain as the world’s predominant economic force. In 1987 the power was flowing from the United States to the Asian economic superpower, Japan.”<sup>14</sup>

Although history proved Soros wrong on this last point, the sense of loss of control and decadence had been widespread in the United States since the 1970s, and the staggering growth of the Japanese economy prompted calls for protectionism to defend U.S. interests.<sup>15</sup>

The wrangling among OECD leaders failed to secure a stable environment for transnational transactions and highlighted the growing divergence of interests between national financial institutions and private multinational corporations. The failure of multilateral cooperation in monetary policy stemmed from asymmetric competition between sovereign states and underregulated transnational and offshore markets. Currency manipulation prompted multinational corporations to hedge the associated risks and carve out regulatory interstices, which furthered the financialization of business activities.

This chapter examines the global dimension of the 1987 crash through the interconnections and discontinuities of the financial world, highlighting the imperial continuity and colonial legacy of such an “archipelago.” The use of this term relies on a cross-fertilization of two definitions: Pierre Veltz used the geographic archipelago as a metaphor for a coherent but discontinuous geographic space with considerable heterogeneity in terms of topographic, historical, and environment characteristics.

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<sup>11</sup> Daniel Gros, (2010), “Currency Wars?” *Intereconomics*, 45: 338-339.

<sup>12</sup> Frank Bohn, (2013), “The Politics of Surprise Devaluations: Modelling Motives for Giving up a Peg,” *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik / Journal of Economics and Statistics*, 233 (5/6): 562-574.

<sup>13</sup> While analyzing the causes of the October 1987 crash, the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms identified the news of higher trade deficits as responsible for the depreciation of the dollar, the rise of interest rates, and the fear mongering among U.S. investors that their foreign counterparts would sell off dollar-denominated stocks. Brady Commission, (1988), *Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms*, Washington, DC: GPO. This hypothesis was supported by Richard E. Caves, Jeffrey A. Frankel and Ronald W. Jones, (1990), *World Trade and Payments*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers; Robert J. Shiller, (1990), “Speculative Prices and Popular Models,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 4 (2): 55-65.

<sup>14</sup> George Soros, (1988), “After Black Monday,” *Foreign Policy*, 70: 65-82 (here at 66).

<sup>15</sup> Clyde V. Prestowitz, (1989), *Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future To Japan and How To Reclaim It*, New York: Basic Books.

He extended the concept to highlight the territorial discontinuity of globalization, similar to Saskia Sassen's view of globalization as a network of globalized cities rather than a homogeneous connection of the globe.<sup>16</sup> Vanessa Ogle, on the other hand, reintroduced the concept of the archipelago when she investigated the development of offshore centers, which she defines as the cornerstone of modern financial globalization, echoing recent studies on tax havens and their geographical and financial continuity with colonial empires.<sup>17</sup> At the intersection of these two bodies of literature, we propose an alternative geography for the global crash of October 1987, which we consider to be the first of its kind, and contribute to this discussion by redefining the scale of the event. Our central hypothesis is that multinational banks, funds, and brokerage firms benefited from the fluctuations and discrepancies in global integration and contributed to the spread of the crash to countries considered peripheral in the world economy.

The failure of international cooperation precipitated the crash and gave it a historically unprecedented scale. The growing importance of multinational financial firms altered capital flows and reshaped the interdependence of the markets. The center-periphery model – analytically efficient since the 1930s for understanding the world economy from the perspective of the Global South – reached its epistemological when investment banks involved in “Third World” debt became major players in financial globalization in the 1980s. The Mexican debt crisis of 1982, which nearly triggered a 2008-style global banking crisis, marked an overlooked turning point in the history of multinational banking bailouts that highlighted the bargaining power of banks vis-à-vis governments and international organizations in enforcing financial deregulation. This alternative history of global financial integration also uncovers an alternative geography of modern finance. The regions of the global “archipelago” overlap with the colonial legacy of very old banking institutions. This colonial continuum provided these institutions with a testing ground for unregulated financial practices and generated unprecedented competition between national regulatory frameworks on the legal side, and stock markets participants on the business side.

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<sup>16</sup> Pierre Veltz, (1996), *Mondialisation, villes et territoires. L'économie d'archipel*, Paris: PUF; Saskia Sassen (Ed.), (2002a), *Global Networks, Linked Cities*, New York: Routledge; Saskia Sassen, (2002b), *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>17</sup> Ogle's definition of the modern archipelago capitalism is embedded in the continuity with colonial empires: “As empires continental and other gradually came undone over the course of the long mid-twentieth century, the emerging offshore world replaced empire's unevenness with another variety of lumpiness. An archipelago-like landscape of distinct legal spaces—sometimes carved out within a national territory, sometimes located in smaller territorial units on the margins of more sizable states, sometimes hosted in city-states—re-created some of the unevenness that had characterized the nineteenth century world of empire.” Vanessa Ogle, (2017), “Archipelago Capitalism: Tax Havens, Offshore Money, and the State, 1950s-1970s,” *The American Historical Review*, 122 (5): 1431-1458 (here at 1432). See also Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy and Christian Chavagneux, (2010), *Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Sandra Halperin and Ronen Palan (Eds.), (2015), *Legacies of Empire. Imperial Roots of the Contemporary Global Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## **Interrogating 1970s Italian energy policies amid political and archival fragmentation**

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Energy policies have had a fundamental and complicated impact on the history of European integration all the way to the current geopolitical framework. My research focuses on the energy policies implemented by the European Community (EC) in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock. It examines the reasons behind the failure in the creation of a Community energy policy and the decision by eight of the nine EC Member States to delegate their energy security to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Juxtaposing the case study of France - the only Member State not to join the IEA, pressing instead for a community energy policy – with the one of Italy, this study investigates the relationship between national energy policies of the two states and their position within the EC and the IEA.

This research examines the relationship between national energy policies and political decisions taken within the EC and the IEA. Indeed, France and Italy were among the EC's major oil importers. While France decided not to join the IEA, Italy became one of the founding members. The Italian governments between 1974 and 1979 were among the main supporters of French stances within the Community, and devoted particular attention to bilateral relations with producer countries. Despite the support towards a Community energy policy, Italy became a member of the IEA, to avoid exacerbating relations with the United States who had been taking a stern position on Italian domestic politics. My research investigates the shared key issues facing the bilateral relations of France and Italy, focusing on foreign policy towards the producing countries, putting it in context with their substantially different domestic policies. In this particular paper, I will focus mainly on the connection and disconnection I am facing while writing the chapter on my Italian case-study.

To fully understand the development of energy policies it is necessary to take in consideration the various dimensions underlying the 'energy issue'. First, the national dimension, based on domestic industrial policy, is often complex and multifaced; then a bilateral and transnational dimension consisting of the exchange of energy sources which includes multiple actors, including national actors, companies (State-owned or private), and organizations (OPEC, IEA, EC). Finally, there is an international dimension to the 'energy issue': energy plays a role in the larger scheme of power and relations between the various international actors. Of course, the complexity to this intricate energy system lies in the fact that many actors have a role in all the different dimensions and these roles need to be considered in the general narrative. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the main leading lines in Italian energy policies, and the *file rouge* which connected the various dimension of the energy issue.

The secondary literature and documents show a shift of Italian energy strategies from the late 1960s, where nuclear energy seemed to be a valid alternative to imported oil.<sup>1</sup> The partial stop and the failure of the Italian nuclear energy development is linked to the creation of ENEL (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica) in the early 1960s and the strained relation between ENEL and the Consiglio Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare (CNEN).<sup>2</sup> At the same time, ENI's (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) strategies after the death of Enrico Mattei in 1962<sup>3</sup> brought the company to increasingly relate to the import of crude oil and reduced the refining capacity.<sup>4</sup> Hence, in the aftermath of the crisis, Italy was highly dependent on imported crude oil and highly threatened by the oil crisis.

The 1970s is commonly considered a "troubled" decade for Italian policy: the internal turmoil, the economic crisis and the governments' instability played a destabilizing role in the making of Italian energy policies. The severity of the energy crisis brought the creation of the Programma Energetico Nazionale (PEN) by the Ministry of Industry Donat-Cattin in 1975 (Moro IV).<sup>5</sup> The plan aimed at increasing the funding of national energy industry through the Ministero delle Partecipazioni Statali and towards the two national companies (ENI and ENEL), in order to increase Italian energy production and reduce its dependency from imported energy sources.

Yet, connecting and identifying recurring patterns in all these various dimensions proper of the energy issue can be challenging, especially in a context where we experience a constant lack of archival materials. In fact, the so-called *anni di piombo*<sup>6</sup> – the Italian Troubles – the years between 1968 and 1980 are acknowledged as one of the most controversial and complicated decades of the Italian republican history. The political terrorism and its consequences need to be considered as one of the reasons of the social and political instability of the 1970s. The extreme radicalization of the extra-parliamentarian political movements produced 12960 attacks between 1969 and 1980, with 362 victims.<sup>7</sup> This violence developed from different political groups and individuals and resulted in political terrorism.<sup>8</sup> The political tensions and social turbulences of these years had a radical impact

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<sup>1</sup>Crisi Petrolifera, Rapporti Bilaterali con i Paesi Arabi, Busta 41, Fascicolo 71.1 – 71.2. Ufficio del Consigliere diplomatico II versamento, 1964 – 1984, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS).

Silvio Labbate, *Il Governo Dell'energia: L'Italia Dal Petrolio al Nucleare (1945-1975)*, 1. ed, Quaderni Di Storia (Firenze: Le Monnier, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> Labbate. *Il Governo dell'Energia*.

<sup>3</sup> Mattei was president of ENI from 1953.

<sup>4</sup> Elisabetta Bini, *La Potente Benzina Italiana: Guerra Fredda e Consumi Di Massa Tra Italia, Stati Uniti e Terzo Mondo, 1945-1973*, 1a edizione, Studi Storici Carocci 208 (Roma: Carocci editore, 2013); Labbate, *Il Governo Dell'energia*.

<sup>5</sup> Roma, 22/12/1976, Intervento del ministro dell'Industria, on. Carlo Donat-Cattin alla Camera sulla politica energetica, Archivio Carlo Donat-Cattin 624, Archivio Fondazione Donat-Cattin (AFDC).

<sup>6</sup> The expression *anni di piombo* derived from 1981 film *Die bleierne Zeit* of the German filmmaker Margarethe von Trotta. Marc Lazar and Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, *Il libro degli anni di piombo: storia e memoria del terrorismo italiano* (Milano: Rizzoli, 2010). And Riccardo Brizzi et al., eds., *L'Italia Del Terrorismo: Partiti, Istituzioni e Società*, 1a edizione, Studi Storici Carocci 354 (Roma: Carocci editore, 2021).

<sup>7</sup> Lazar and Matard-Bonucci, *Il libro degli anni di piombo*. 7

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem

on Italian history and set the ground for major political changes.<sup>9</sup> The tension around the Italian social and political discourse was linked to the economic crisis of the 1970s, where the oil shock played a significant role. Arguably, the Italian national political tension which culminated in *anni di piombo* and the link with the international and economic conjunctures are still overlooked and the studies on the decade experienced a huge political polarization, mixed with a certain difficulty to access to relevant documents and archives.

Therefore, the analysis of Italian energy strategies overlaps with and expands the setting of the domestic political crisis. In order to give a picture of the aftermath of the oil crisis in Italy, it is required to connect different aspects of Italian political sphere. Hence it is possible to divide the energy policy in two main axis: on the one hand, the governments attempted to create a domestic energy policy, investing on the state-owned energy enterprises – ENI and ENEL – through the Ministry of Industry and Ministero delle Partecipazioni Statali (MPS).<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, there was the diplomatic action planned by the government, which was based on two pivotal points: first, a rapprochement with the Arab countries<sup>11</sup>; second, it aimed to strengthen and reaffirm Italy's position within the European Community through a policy oriented towards European cooperation.<sup>12</sup>

In the pursuit of these two strategies, Aldo Moro, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mariano Rumor V Government had a crucial role. Moro was convinced that Italy should secure its place as a “bridge country” between Europe and the Arab world, acquiring a key position in the Mediterranean framework.<sup>13</sup> In this context, the deterioration of the relationship with the crude oil producers could provide an opportunity to set relations on a new type of collaboration, rather than constituting the first

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<sup>9</sup> Silvio Pons, ‘Cold War Republic: The “External Constraint” In Italy During The 1970s’, in *Italy in the International System from Détente to the End of the Cold War. The Underrated Ally*. (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 35–69.

<sup>10</sup> SERVIZIO STUDI ECONOMICI. Documentazione relativa ai problemi della situazione economica e industriale italiana e nel contesto internazionale, Busta 13, Archivio Storico ENI, from now on ENI.

Doc. RES(78)1. Programma Energetico Nazionale, predisposto dal Ministro dell’Industria, Commercio e Artigianato, On. Carlo Donat-Cattin, sulla base delle conclusioni del dibattito parlamentare dell’autunno 1977 ed approvato dal Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE) del 23 dicembre 1977. Busta 624, Fondazione Carlo Donat-Cattin, Polo del 900, from now on FCDC.

<sup>11</sup> Fondo Aldo Moro, Busta 157. Archivio Centrale dello Stato, from now on ACS. On the same topic: Italo Garzia, ‘Il Mediterraneo Nel Pensiero Politico Di Aldo Moro’, in *Aldo Moro, l’Italia Repubblicana e i Popoli Del Mediterraneo*, Entropie 40 (Nardò (LE): Besa, 2013), 56–68.

<sup>12</sup> Regarding the Italian political crisis of 1970s Antonio Varsori, *Dalla Rinascita al Declino: Storia Internazionale Dell’Italia Repubblicana*, Biblioteca Storica (Bologna: Società editrice Il mulino, 2022), 330–57. On the European orientation of Government Rumor V: Fondo Mariano Rumor, Affari Politici, Busta 267, Fasc. 5. Affari Economici, Busta 270, fasc. 32 and fasc. 35, Archivio Storico del Senato della Repubblica, from now on ASS.

Fondo Aldo Moro, Busta 161; Busta 162, ACS and Garzia, ‘Il Mediterraneo Nel Pensiero Politico Di Aldo Moro’, 96–100. Guido Formigoni, *Storia d’Italia Nella Guerra Fredda: 1943-1978*, Biblioteca Storica (Bologna: Società editrice Il mulino, 2016). Varsori, *Dalla Rinascita al Declino*.

<sup>13</sup> Luciano Monzali, ‘Aldo Moro e La Politica Estera Dell’Italia Repubblicana Nel Mediterraneo (1969-1978). Momenti e Problemi.’, in *Aldo Moro, l’Italia Repubblicana e i Popoli Del Mediterraneo*, Entropie 40 (Nardò (LE): Besa, 2013), 68–124.

step towards a rupture of relations. This is highlighted by Moro's diplomatic trip to Arab countries in the early months of 1974 and the visit of the Ministers of energy of Saudi Arabia, Libya and Algeria in Italy.<sup>14</sup>

The main problem I am facing to connect and compare all these different aspects in Italian 1970s is related to the lack of archival material, which is, in the most cases still under embargo (for the diplomatic sources) or lost in the Italian bureaucracy. The literature regarding the Italian energy policy, and especially on the domestic aspects, is outdated and focused only on partial aspects of the energy issue, disconnecting and fragmenting a structure that is already fragmented. How can we address interconnection and disruption between all these different actors and frameworks intrinsic political history of Italy comprehensively? And how can we connect this complicated political history with the study of the energy issue, which is *per se* fragmented?

This disconnection is also related to the lack or disorganization of sources. The embargo on Italian diplomatic sources could be partially overcome connecting other kind of sources, like the sources produced by the state-owned enterprises, which played a pivotal role in shaping energy policies in the aftermath of the oil shock. Hence, relevant parts of my chapter are based on ENI documents, which, however, for obvious reasons, lack from the perspective of decision-making process. This aspect produces a different approach and critical lens to political history and international collaboration bringing together a variety of documents from political and industrial actors.

I tried to overcome such gaps between diplomatic and industrial archives looking at the documents of Fondazione Donat-Cattin in Turin, and although these documents have been helpful, they too are rather incomplete without proper chronology. One example involves the documents produced by the CIPE.<sup>15</sup> They show that there were approved multiple versions of the Programma Energetico Nazionale, but in the documents of Fondazione Donat-Cattin and ENI only one version of the PEN is present (the one of 1977). However, other sources in ENI's archive quote and discuss the other version of the PEN (specifically the one of 1975): re-connecting these different ENI sources with the one of the CIPE enables to reconstruct (even if partially) the multiple versions of the PEN, whose development stages remain undisclosed in state and diplomatic archives.

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<sup>14</sup> Busta 157, Ministero degli Affari Esteri 6, Serie 2, questioni nazionali e internazionali, Fondo Aldo Moro, ACS. Busta 41, Fasc.71.1.-72.2. Libia, Consigliere Diplomatico Il Versamento, ACS.

Busta 248, Fasc. 89, Fondo Mariano Rumor, ASS.

<sup>15</sup> The CIPE (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica) was collegial organization established by Law 48/1967, which had the aim to discuss and determine the national economic policy guidelines. The CIPE coordinated the activities of the various ministries, administrations and public bodies operating in the Italian national economy. <https://www.programmazioneeconomica.gov.it/competenze-cipess/>

## **The illegal trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. An ocean of disconnected networks**

On the 11th of December of 1819, the Captain John Leeke of the African Squadron captured the schooner *Nuestra Señora de las Nieves* in front of the Gallinas's rivers. On board, there were 122 enslaved. On the 28th of the same month, the two ships arrived at Sierra Leone where, after a short trial, the schooner was condemned as a lawful prize in the Spanish and British Mixed Commission. The slave ship was found guilty of breaking the international treaty of 1817 against the slave trade, which abolished any slave traffic done by Spanish subjects and any voyage directed to Spanish territories. 121 enslaved were emancipated as Liberated Africans, and one died during the voyage from Gallinas to the British colony.<sup>1</sup>

The Captain of *Nuestra Señora de las Nieves* was the Catalan Francesc Llopis,<sup>2</sup> born in the town of Sitges. He was an experimented slave trader that, according to the sources found in the slave ship, knew well about different enclaves in the African coasts to trade with local communities for slaves. In the schooner, there were bills, a manual on how to better do the slave trade around different points on the coast of Africa, and a diary with literal translations from Spanish to African languages of quotes useful to do the slave trade.<sup>3</sup>

Tienes esclavos	<i>òcha carre</i>
traye esclavos	<i>Baga òchaca</i>
Quando pides por este esclavo	<i>obleandé óchaca</i>
Es muy caro; pide mucho	<i>aquebela, teimpolo</i>
Es muy barato	<i>y golo cue cue</i>
Es muy buen esclavo	<i>ocha cambia</i>
Es un esclavo regular	<i>eje embia hejombe</i>
Es un esclavo biejo	<i>ocha cambolo</i>
no es asi que no es muy biejo	<i>gelenbolo</i>
no me gusta porque este esclavo es <u>muy pequeño</u>	<i>miretonda ocha úrumbé</i>
no me gusta esta mujer porque tiene los pechos caidos	<i>miretonda a buene égirami</i>
tienes algun esclavo	<i>mie joga arie osaca</i>
"bamos aberlo allegado canoa con esclabos"	<i>biagailogene achuma guarro ossaca</i>
"quantos esclabos à traído"	<i>abia sircamia</i>
"Los Esclabos son parami o para otro captian"	<i>assaca huami beninbi ungo homoni</i>
"estoy muy contento y haré aqui mi trata si nos combenimos con los precios delos esclabos"	<i>miatonda bandamina bianbieygolo intechani</i>

<sup>1</sup> British Parliamentary Papers (BPP) Class A. 1821, pp.76-77; Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (TSTD), voyage 2319.

<sup>2</sup> In some sources changed to Spanish, Francisco López.

<sup>3</sup> The National Archives (TNA): FO 315/71. Case *Nuestra Señora de las Nieves*.

Fig.1: Some translations from the manual of Francesc Llopis. These are some that directly relate to the bargaining for enslaved. There are also translations of the names of products, numbers, months, and expressions of courtesy.

According to Leida Fernández Prieto, this case is very useful because shows the fact that existed certain products which were essential in the culture of the enslaved and the slave ship, such as rice and *ñame* for the substance of the captives.<sup>4</sup> Further, this case is representative because it also contains many bills of exchange and letters, showing the connections and trades that existed in the illegal slave trade.<sup>5</sup> From another ship, but with similar chronologies, we have the products given to Gallinas' population to acquire 230 enslaved:

Object and quantity	Value per unity ( <i>varras</i> )	Total ( <i>varras</i> )
169 guineas azules	9	1521
150 pañuelos finos de 12 piezas	5	750
94 piezas de seda	7	658
150 piezas de Madras	6	2700
155 piezas de la Pues (?)	1620	1620
75 piezas Burones	14	1050
90 piezas Samosas	15	1350
275 piezas de Boemmarly	3	825
92 barriles de polvora	25	2300
1320 galones de rom	1	1320
39600 galones tabaco		13200
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>27294</b>

Fig.2: Notes on the bill given to the King by Captain Rodrigues from *La Española* (1825) to get 230 enslaved. Source: TNA, FO 315/72

Nevertheless, and despite the fact many sources help us to explain the illegal Atlantic slave trade, at least based on particular cases such as the one of *NS de las Nieves* or the schooner *Española*, the reality is that many of the deductions in these histories are particularly focused from the Abolitionist point of view. The ships that the historians analyze were usually only those captured by the British Navy. We tend to focus on the reports done by the judges of the Mixed Commissions.<sup>6</sup> These ships only correspond to 5-10% of all voyages that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century engaged with slave-trading venues. To recreate the others, we tend to use qualitative information found in the captured ships regarding other ships and, especially, claims of the British consuls in Cuba and Brazil about the arrival of different slave ships every year.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, many ships contain much

<sup>4</sup> Fernández Prieto, *El barco de esclavos*.

<sup>5</sup> Guimerá Ravina, “Marins catalans en el tràfic d’esclaus: els viatges del capità Llopis i Llopis (1817-1819).”

<sup>6</sup> The British Parliamentary Papers about the Slave Trade, class A, B, and C.

<sup>7</sup> Further, there exists the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database that works also with algorithms to calculate minimum numbers of voyages and enslaved.

less information than the ones here analyzed; a fact that makes more difficult the developing of a coherent history on all the trade.

On the one hand, there are many difficulties to comprehend the illegal slave trade for its illegality per se. Many ships used different flags and passports, legal and illegal, to avoid the visit on board of the African Squadron when they were departing America or arriving in Africa. Further, many changed its name to Portuguese, French, Spanish, Catalan, or even Italian, to confound the Abolitionist forces. Moreover, there existed the repetition of ship names with the same objective. Also, many ships lack important documents of their characteristics, crew, and itinerary because, at the moment of capture, the slave ship officials threw their documents into the sea. As an example, the brig *Matilde*, that was captured on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January of 1839 of the River Gaboon by the African squadron's schooner *Fair Rosamond*. The Austrian captain, Mariano Sgitcovich, who was a Spanish resident in Havana, threw many documents to the sea. The ship was captured with a Portuguese flag but also contained a Tuscan one on board.<sup>8</sup>

Another problem is identifying the origins of the people captured in the slave ships, and, especially, the reason. Indeed, from just an Atlantic point of view is complicated to address because there is a lack of proper African sources and there are big generalizations that the historiography has claimed on it. It is believed that one of the main reasons for some African elites to engage in the capture of Human Beings to sell to the trans-Atlantic slave traders was the gun and powder for slaves' cycle.<sup>9</sup> Despite its utility, this says nothing about the lives of those captured and their resistances to this enslavement – on Africa and then on board of the ships. Sources tend to neglect the histories of resistance, though the history of *Amistad*, and the direct voice of the enslaved there, serves as a good example of how to address the voice and origins of the main characters of these inhuman activities.<sup>10</sup> Some other initiatives to readdress the no-voice of the enslavement are the Liberated Africans webpage, where there is recorded the emancipated people in the Atlantic, and the people of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. The last is a database with all

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<sup>8</sup> BPP Class A 1839-40, pp.62.

<sup>9</sup> Whatley and Arbor, "THE GUN-SLAVE CYCLE IN THE 18TH CENTURY BRITISH SLAVE TRADE IN AFRICA."

<sup>10</sup> Felipe-Gonzalez, Cole, and Lawrance, "The Amistad Saga"; Rediker, "The African Origins of the Amistad Rebellion, 1839"; Zeuske, *Amistad*.

the names of the emancipated, usually in African languages, and their origins and moment of enslavement.<sup>11</sup>

Entering to problems per se of disconnection, I have to say that I do not know what usually happens when the slave ship is condemned. Usually was sold on auction, and sometimes sold by parts. But as some sources indicate, those who bought these ships and elements might have been agents of slave traders, usually from neighboring regions to the British colony, such as Gallinas or Sherbro, or directly in Havana when condemned there. How this reflects the different histories hidden around Sierra Leone, the slave trade, and its regions? I think this is difficult to comprehend and to really identify who, what, and why, was participating in the trade and to what degree.

Moreover, the history of the slave trade was very seasonal with the rains from June to November. Therefore, most of the ships captured and condemned are always from October-November to May, approximately. It seems that nearly half a year does not appear in the sources, further than only some letters found in slave ships talking about the preparation of voyages, but not in the official records. Therefore, sometimes is very complicated to know exactly what the people working on the slave trade on the African Coast and the Atlantic more broadly were doing during these times, especially sailors and masters of ships. For example, we have the case of the schooner *Segunda Socorro*: the schooner's rich log serves to identify the circuit of movement of the ship to the Gallinas coast in a moment of the high demand for enslaved in the region. From the departure from Havana on the 28<sup>th</sup> of December of 1832 until its capture leaving Gallinas night between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> of July, there are 188 entrances – 188 days. Usually, the slave ships in that period could start and finish a voyage from Havana to Gallinas and back in less than five months. Nevertheless, the log of the ship stops indicating exactly the location of movements and much key information when arriving on the coasts of Africa.<sup>12</sup>

Further, it is a bit frustrating the fact of not to know the histories of the people seen or recorded. I have the list of many names and roles, but usually, as much, as I can know the place where they come from.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, this usually says nothing about who are they,

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<sup>11</sup> Check the [Liberated Africans webpage](#) and [the People of the TST](#).

<sup>12</sup> TNA: FO: 315/77. Case of *Segunda Socorro*.

<sup>13</sup> Rediker did a Social History of the slave trade in Rediker, *The Slave Ship*. Moreover, his classical book on ships and sailors is very valuable: Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*.

and why are participating in this practice that was illegal and, further, morally condemned. An example of this is the list of the crew of the *Sao Paolo de Loando*, captured in 1840:

Name	Age	Role	Origin
Mariano Sgitovich	30	Captain	Oporto (fake)
Jose Segarreta	32	1st pilot	Valenia de Miño
Miguel Olivia Prato	32	Curinheiro	New Orleans
Ignacio Fernandez	30	Marinherio	Fesceira
Joze Días	29	Marinherio	Vianna
Joaquín José Maria	24	Marinherio	Lisboa
Miguel Felipe	19	Marinherio	Oporto
Antonio Rivero	18	Marinherio	Vianna
Joao Marques	24	Marinherio	Lisboa
Mari Jose da Costa	29	Marinherio	Oporto
Francisco Gonzalez	32		Montevideo
Miguel Felipe	17		Oporto
Manoel Montangués	19		Rio
Manuel Flores	18		Coimbra
Jocu Albez	20		Coimbra
Francisco Echevarria	20		Rio
Paolo Antonio Alvares	17	Pasageiro	Africa

Fig.3. List of the crew from *Sao Paolo de Loando*. TNA: FO 315/91.

All in all, the study of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade can be difficult and disappointing sometimes because, further than the moral challenges that lay behind the topic, despite having many connections, names of people, and regions, many times there are substantial holes in the histories. We need to fill them with examples of other slave ships, and even though this helps to create possible realities that fit the Atlantic history, this can create problems on how to go further what is already known and, especially, knowing more about the histories of the involved in the illegal slave trade, being perpetrators or victims. Finally, I would like to challenge myself in this workshop on how I would like to make these disconnections work in my research, elements that until now I did not engage much on. Is it possible that by productively dealing with disconnections I can deal better with the people enslaved without erasing their lives? How can disconnections help to understand and reflect them as subjects rather than objects?

Per una problematizzazione delle pratiche espositive dei musei etnologici missionari:  
il caso del Museo Etnologico Vaticano Anima Mundi

Una delle forme di rappresentazione della storia, della cultura e delle religioni “altre” rispetto a quella cristiano-occidentale si è concretizzata, sin dall’antichità, in un complesso di operazioni di acquisizione ed esposizione di artefatti di cultura materiale locale i quali, a partire dal XVI secolo e dall’importanza assunta dalla pratica del collezionismo, iniziano a confluire in vere e proprie collezioni private sotto la denominazione inventariale di *esotica*.

A fronte del significato più largamente politico e ideologico che questo tipo di oggetti e collezioni, oggi conservati all’interno di istituzioni museali antropologiche, etnologiche o etnografiche, hanno rivestito e rivestono tutt’oggi (si pensi, ad esempio, al copricapo indigeno donato a Papa Francesco in occasione della visita in Canada nel luglio 2022 per la prima scusa ufficiale della Chiesa alle violenze perpetrate dalla scuola cattolica tra il 1800 e il 1900), l’esposizione dei manufatti di cultura “extra-europea” crea non pochi problemi in ambito della musealizzazione; nella maggior parte dei casi vengono inscenati i mondi lontani di cui fanno parte gli oggetti esposti, sotto forma di narrazioni dall’aura esotica che sembrano rispecchiare più un’anacronistica e smaccata visione dell’alterità (“il buon selvaggio”) che una chiara narrazione delle memorie e delle acquisizioni che li ha riuniti sotto lo stesso “tetto” europeo.

La paradossale non-connettività, disconnessione di enti museali di presunta connessione globale rappresenta anche il carattere rappresentativo e, forse, il più complesso di tali istituzioni. Questa dicotomia pone infatti innumerevoli problematiche, determinate non solo dalla difficoltà di mettere in relazione oggetti appartenenti a culture, ideali e religioni che nella maggior parte dei casi hanno avuto pochissimi (se non nulli) interscambi di natura culturale, ma anche, in maniera più esplicita, dalla quasi assenza di una narrazione che sia in grado di ricostruire le pratiche di acquisizione (spesso non pacifiche) dei manufatti. Negli ultimi decenni, alle richieste di adottare una «museologia di collaborazione» (G. Pinna, *I diritti dei popoli indigeni e la museologia di collaborazione*, «Museologia scientifica», 5 (2011), n. 1-2, pp. 28-52), provenienti, ad esempio, dalle già citate First Nation canadesi nei confronti dei musei statunitensi, si sono aggiunte vere e proprie rivendicazioni di possesso e restituzione di oggetti indigeni da parte dei paesi di provenienza, le quali sono un esempio tangibile di come la tematica della cultura materiale sia estremamente attuale e di carattere più socio-politico che culturale.

Da qui sorgono numerose domande: cosa significa al giorno d’oggi esporre culture diverse all’interno di un museo etnologico? Cosa significa “esporre” una cultura? “Mettere in scena la globalità” significa anche farla dialogare con l’alterità? Che tipo di dialogo può avvenire nella disconnessione?

Alla luce di tali quesiti, all’interno del più ampio dibattito sul ruolo dei musei etnologici deve essere collocata anche la riflessione sui musei etnologici missionari, i quali emergono sempre più come oggetti distinti di investigazione nell’ambito di una produttiva intersezione tra antropologia, storia e studi museali; i missionari cristiani, infatti, hanno per secoli raccolto materiale sacro e profano dalle comunità indigene di tutto il mondo.

Alle domande appena poste se ne aggiungono quindi altre: che ruolo e che responsabilità riveste nella società odierna un museo etnologico missionario? Quali sono i principali musei etnologici missionari italiani, e che tipo di dialogo instaurano con il pubblico e la cultura locale e globale? Quali sono le prerogative e le modalità di auto-rappresentazione di questa peculiare tipologia museale?

Nel tentativo di dare una risposta a tali quesiti verrà presa come caso specifico di studio una delle principali collezioni museali missionarie italiane, ossia il Museo Etnologico Vaticano.

Inaugurato a Roma nel 1927, inizialmente all'interno del palazzo del Laterano e sotto la direzione dell'etnologo cattolico Wilhelm Schmidt, il Museo è il frutto dell'incontro tra i manufatti riuniti in occasione della Mostra Missionaria Vaticana del 1925 voluta da Pio XI, alcune delle collezioni provenienti dal Museo Borgiano di Propaganda Fide e i doni di diverse congregazioni missionarie che sin dal Cinquecento hanno contribuito all'afflusso di prodotti artistici "esotici" in collezioni europee.

Il Museo rimase nella sede del Laterano fino al 1963 fino a quando, per volontà di Giovanni XXIII, venne spostato nel 1973 nella sede attuale all'interno della Città del Vaticano.

In occasione del recente riallestimento del 2019, voluto da Papa Francesco, il Museo assume il nome di *Anima Mundi*; ridenominazione che intende esprimere il proposito di rappresentare, tramite la cultura custodita, l'anima di tutte le culture del mondo.

Come sottolinea la direttrice dei Musei Vaticani Barbara Jatta in un articolo pubblicato su *L'Osservatore Romano* ("Ottantamila opere. L'anima del mondo", 20 ottobre 2019), il nuovo progetto di riallestimento museale, sotto il coordinamento di padre Nicola Mapelli, intende concretizzare questo proposito enfatizzando l'importanza del restauro dei manufatti custoditi e investendo sul Laboratorio di restauro polimaterico. Si rende esplicito in tal modo il messaggio che Papa Francesco ha trasmesso in occasione del suo discorso per l'inaugurazione del Museo e della mostra *Mater Anzazonia. 'The deep breath the world* il 18 ottobre 2019: «[lo straniero che viene a visitare il museo] dovrà sentire che la "sua" arte ha lo stesso valore ed è curata e custodita con la stessa passione che si riserva ai capolavori del Rinascimento o alle immortali sculture greche e romane che richiamano ogni anno milioni di persone. Qui troverà uno spazio speciale: lo spazio del dialogo, dell'apertura all'altro, dell'incontro».

Nel contesto del workshop vorrei stimolare una riflessione collettiva circa il modo in cui il Vaticano cerca di portare avanti una visione "inclusiva" della cultura umana in un ambito, quello dell'esposizione di manufatti esteri (spesso di carattere religioso), nel quale la fruizione degli oggetti è stata mediata dalla messa in scena museale e dalla valorizzazione dell'azione missionaria di acquisizione di un patrimonio culturale "altro".

Come espresso da Sabina Brevaglieri nell'ultima edizione di *Quaderni Storici* dedicata al *missionary collecting* e da lei curata, la rivendicazione missionaria del nuovo riallestimento del Museo *Anima Mundi*, più che creare un rapporto di dialogo storico-critico con le pratiche collezionistiche della prima età moderna (in parte costitutive del Museo), rafforza il peso della sua visione decentralizzante (potremmo dire "disconnessa") non portando in maniera esplicitiva i suoi retaggi coloniali, le relazioni di potere e il forte impegno anti-idolatratico missionario dedito più alla conversione delle anime che al rispetto dei culti e delle culture locali.

A questo proposito la sfida curatoriale è alta e il confronto con altri centri di cultura etnologica italiani, anglosassoni, francesi, o tedeschi può essere utile ai fini di una più attenta riflessione sulle effettive carenze nel dialogo espositivo vaticano, e rappresentare un monito alla ricerca di nuove soluzioni all'interno di un campo in cui la matrice missionaria del museo è ancora troppo spesso letta in una prospettiva esclusivamente apologetica e celebrativa, ed è rimossa del tutto la complessità del fenomeno espositivo religioso.

For a problematisation of the exhibition practices of missionary ethnological museums: the case of the Vatican Ethnological Museum *Anima Mundi*

One form of representation of histories, cultures, and religions of the “other”, different from the Christian-Western one, has taken shape since ancient times in a complex of operations of acquisition and exhibition of local material culture artifacts, which, starting from the 16th century, and in view of the importance assumed by the practice of collecting, began to converge in private collections under the inventory name of *esotica*.

In light of the broader political and ideological significance that these types of objects and collections, now preserved within anthropological, ethnological, or ethnographic museum institutions, have had and still have today (think, for example, of the indigenous headdress donated to Pope Francis on the occasion of his visit to Canada in July 2022 for the Church’s first official apology for the violence perpetrated by Catholic schools between 1800 and 1900), the exhibition of “extra-European” cultural artifacts creates many problems in the context of musealization. In most cases, distant worlds to which the exhibited objects belong are staged in the form of narratives with an exotic aura that seems to reflect more an anachronistic and simplistic vision of otherness (“the noble savage”) than a clear narrative of the memories and acquisitions that have brought them together under the same European “roof.”

The paradoxical non-connectivity, disconnection of museal entities of supposed global connection also embodies the typical and perhaps the most complex character of such institutions. This dichotomy poses countless problems, determined not only by the difficulty of relating objects belonging to cultures, ideals, and religions that in most cases have had very little (if any) cultural exchange but also, more explicitly, by the almost complete absence of a narrative capable of reconstructing the practices of acquisition (often not peaceful) of artifacts. In recent decades, requests to adopt a “collaborative museology” (G. Pinna, *The rights of indigenous peoples and collaborative museology*, “Scientific Museology,” 5 (2011), n. 1-2, pp. 28-52), coming, for example, from the Canadian First Nations to US museums, have been followed by claims of ownership and restitution of indigenous objects by the countries of origin, which are a tangible example of how the issue of material culture is extremely relevant today and more socio-political than cultural.

From here arise numerous questions: what does it mean today to exhibit different cultures in an ethnological museum? What does it mean to “exhibit” a culture? Does “staging globality” also mean making it dialogue with otherness? What kind of dialogue can take place in disconnection?

In light of these questions, the broader debate on the role of ethnological museums must also include reflection on missionary ethnological museums, which are increasingly emerging as distinct objects of investigation in the context of a productive intersection between anthropology, history, and museum studies; Christian missionaries, in fact, have collected sacred and profane material from indigenous communities around the world for centuries.

To the questions just posed, others are added: what role and responsibility does a missionary ethnological museum have in today’s society? What are the main Italian missionary ethnological museums, and what kind of dialogue do they establish with the local and global public and culture? What are the prerogatives and self-representation modalities of this peculiar museum typology?

In an attempt to answer these questions, one of the main Italian missionary museum collections, the Vatican Ethnological Museum, will be taken as a specific case study. Inaugurated in Rome in 1927, initially inside the Lateran Palace and under the direction of Catholic ethnologist Wilhelm Schmidt, the Museum is the result of the meeting between the artifacts gathered on the

occasion of the Vatican Missionary Exhibition of 1925 wanted by Pius XI, some of the collections from the Borgia Museum of Propaganda Fide, and the gifts of various missionary congregations that have contributed to the influx of “exotic” artistic products into European collections since the 16th century.

The Museum remained in the Lateran until 1963 when, at the behest of John XXIII, it was moved in 1973 to its current location inside the Vatican City. On the occasion of the recent 2019 redesign, wanted by Pope Francis, the Museum takes on the name of *Anima Mundi*; a renaming that intends to express the purpose of representing, through the preserved culture, the soul of all cultures of the world.

As the director of the Vatican Museums, Barbara Jatta, emphasizes in an article published in *L'Osservatore Romano* (“Eighty thousand objects. The soul of the world,” October 20, 2019), the new museum redesign project, under the coordination of Father Nicola Mapelli, intends to concretize this purpose by emphasizing the importance of the restoration of the preserved artifacts and investing in the *Laboratorio di restauro polimaterico*. In this way, the message that Pope Francis transmitted on the occasion of his speech for the inauguration of the Museum and the Mater Amazonia exhibition is made explicit. “The stranger who comes to visit the museum must feel that ‘their’ art has the same value and is cared for and preserved with the same passion reserved for the masterpieces of the Renaissance or the immortal Greek and Roman sculptures that attract millions of people every year. Here he will find a special space: the space of dialogue, openness to the other, encounter.”

In the context of the workshop, I would like to stimulate a collective reflection on how the Vatican seeks to carry forward an “inclusive” vision of human culture in an area where the fruition of foreign artifacts (often of a religious nature) has been mediated by museum staging and the valorization of missionary acquisition of the cultural heritage of an “other”.

As expressed by Sabina Brevaglieri in the latest edition of *Quaderni Storici* dedicated to missionary collecting and edited by her, the missionary claim of the new redesign of the *Anima Mundi* Museum, rather than creating a historical-critical dialogue with the collecting practices of the early modern age (which in part contributed to the constitution of the Museum), reinforces the weight of its decentralizing (we could say “disconnected”) vision: it does not explicitly bring to the light its colonial legacies, power relationships, and the strong anti-idolatrous commitment of the missionaries, who were intent more on the conversion of souls than on the respect of local cults and cultures.

In this regard, the curatorial challenge is high, and the comparison with other Italian, Anglo-Saxon, French, or German ethnological centers can be useful for the purpose of a more careful reflection on the actual shortcomings in the Vatican exhibition dialogue, and represent a warning to the search for new solutions within a field where the museum’s missionary matrix is still too often read from an exclusively apologetic and celebratory perspective, and the complexity of the religious exhibition phenomenon is completely removed.

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**Thesis project: The role of the United Nations during Southern Rhodesian Decolonisation**

**Chapter focus: What factors facilitated or obstructed access to the UN?**

In October 1962, Nathan Shamuyarira travelled to New York to represent the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) at the United Nations. He was a petitioner in the General Assembly's Special Political and Decolonisation Committee which dealt with issues relating to decolonisation. Shamuyarira responded to questions from UN Member States about the current political and constitutional developments in Southern Rhodesia. Beyond formal meetings and official business, the UN provided Shamuyarira and other Zimbabwean nationalists the opportunity to socialise with influential state representatives, international activists and bureaucrats. Within one day, he dined with the Ethiopian ambassador, drank tea with a member of Yugoslavian President Tito's delegation, partied at the Ugandan Independence celebration, and ended his evening by "sneaking" into a press corps held by the UN Secretary-General U Thant. Shamuyarira also remembered the welcoming atmosphere at the UN:

“One impressive aspect was the mixture of people of all races on terms of complete equality in every corridor, committee room and in the General Assembly. Racialism is condemned in the preamble to the UN Charter, and it never seemed to arise in daily dealings there... This short, stocky, coloured man at the head of world affairs, respected and listened to by statesmen of all colours and creeds: for someone from the Rhodesian backwoods, where white farmers regard themselves as next to God, it was an important and heartening experience”.<sup>1</sup>

This reflection captures how Shamuyarira appreciated how the UN welcomed him and other peoples from an array of different races and colonial backgrounds. Although overtly romanticised, it also offers a personal insight into how the UN was perceived to offer Zimbabwean nationalists a space to be seen and heard, to mix with already independent UN delegates and importantly to make their case resound on par with the historically dominant

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<sup>1</sup> Nathan M. Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1965), 198.

white settlers. While this equal footing might have been more likely within social spaces in between formal places, it is worth remembering that this was not true for all parts of the UN, particularly the Security Council. However, at this earlier moment in the longer trajectory of Southern Rhodesian decolonisation, the Security Council was not yet engaged nor particularly crucial in assisting the Zimbabwean nationalist cause.

The unforeseen and rapid opening of UN doors to African and Asian state actors from the mid-1950s represented a fluctuating international order, one no longer controlled wholly by European Empires. While the UN's wording of racial equality was more elusive than Shamuriya pointed out, the power dynamics of the General Assembly had shifted after a rapid rise of post-colonial countries becoming UN members between 1957 and 1962. For Shamuyarira, this led to a far more inclusive organisation, with a larger and increasingly receptive environment to his party's calls for independence. Changes in the makeup of the UN Secretariat also led to an increase in post-colonial actors securing managerial and executive positions. For the first ten years of the UN these positions had been – albeit with exceptions – mostly reserved for white diplomats. For historians and actors at the time, including the Secretary-General himself, U Thant understood that his election “as a man of colour from a former colony, was both a symbol and result of that change”.<sup>2</sup>

Newer histories of the UN take seriously how this change opened up the international organisation as an important and more globally inclusive space. Alanna O'Malley reinterprets the different roles of the UN during the Congo Crisis in the early 1960s and considers “the corridors and meeting rooms of the UN as a socialising space” which compelled American and British UN representatives to “interact with representatives from newly independent African and Asian countries who dominated discussions on the Congo and linked them to wider debates on colonial questions”.<sup>3</sup> Social connections between diplomats, nationalists and other international actors at the UN were crucial for negotiating international politics. However the question remains, how does one measure the influence of personal connections at the UN, and what factors facilitate or impede the establishment of those connections in the first place?

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Alanna O'Malley, *The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo Crisis 1960-1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 4.

This extract is the beginning of a chapter in my thesis which examines the role of the United Nations in Southern Rhodesian decolonisation. This chapter aims to explore how different UN structures, procedures and individuals defined and limited the direct engagement of Southern Rhodesian actors at the UN. Social, racial and historical connections between actors were important considerations that determined the inclusion of some over the exclusion of others. Showing the link between the two remains the difficult task at hand. I have several interesting moments which show a shift from the inclusion of various actors across different political and racial divides in Southern Rhodesia to one that ultimately favoured Zimbabwean inclusion and Rhodesian exclusion.

The first moment was in 1953 during the debate about the creation of the Central African Federation in the UN General Assembly's sub-committee of the Committee on Information. Post-colonial members of the Committee, including India and Egypt pushed for the UN to include discussions about Southern Rhodesia, however this was vetoed by the United Kingdom because Southern Rhodesia was not on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. One of the key Zimbabwean nationalists, Joshua Nkomo reflected on the difficulties of getting his case heard at the UN whilst Southern Rhodesia was part of the regional federation. In 1960, Nkomo wrote that Southern Rhodesia was not a "UN legitimate interest" when the Federation was still fully functioning.<sup>4</sup> While the principle of state sovereignty displaced empire as the bedrock international order and led to a greater number of states with equal standing in some parts of the UN, this moment reflects the confinements of nation-state politics that dominated the UN and hindered the access to anti-colonial nationalists whilst the federation was still alive.

A second example will attempt to understand how petitioners reached the UN. Ideally this was unhindered, although the opportunity to physically reach the UN depended on several factors. To coordinate the inclusion of petitioners, a sub-committee on petitions was created. However, the first petition was sent before the sub-committee was established, causing confusion and delay. The first petitioner was Paul Mushonga, the Deputy National President of the Zimbabwe National Party of Southern Rhodesia based in London. He wrote on behalf of his party requesting that he and his colleagues back in Southern Rhodesia give evidence before the Committee. For a week, Mushonga received no word from the committee. After a telephone conversation with the Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Information from Non-

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<sup>4</sup> Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, 86.

Self-Governing Territories, Dragoslav Protitch, to understand why he had no response, Mushonga asked that the Special Committee meeting be postponed until Friday. This was so his party's delegation and legal advisers could have time to travel from Southern Rhodesia. Protitch's later telegram informed Mushonga that his request was impossible because the committee wanted to finish the work by the end of the week: "If you cannot come and make oral presentation Wednesday morning 21 March, it will be open to you to send a written statement".<sup>5</sup>

Mushonga travelled to New York without the other members of his party based in Southern Rhodesia. Petitioners who were inside the colonial territory needed resources and flexibility to make it to New York in a short window of time, often being notified by UN officials that "the United Nations will not be responsible for any expenses on travel or stay in New York".<sup>6</sup> Individuals that ultimately gave oral evidence were either based in London, already in New York or living in the United States, as with the cases of Mushonga and other Zimbabwean nationalists.

The third instance is another moment of exclusion. When the settler government declared a 'Unilateral Declaration of Independence' in November 1965, the new Rhodesian state it aimed to create was labelled an 'illegal racist regime' first by the General Assembly and later by the Security Council. In 1966, the so-called Rhodesian Minister of Justice appealed to join the Security Council discussion about intervention into the territory. The UN Secretary General U Thant personally took it upon himself to ensure the Security Council exclude the "illegal rebels" from any UN space.<sup>7</sup> By exploring several moments of exclusion across the history of Southern Rhodesian decolonisation, this chapter aims to better understand how various UN socialisation space(s) created connections for some and disconnections for others. The problem I am facing is precisely how to bring these examples together, how to measure different factors and determine what influence they had in the regulation of access to the UN.

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<sup>5</sup> UNARMS, S-0504-0079-0015, Hearing – Paul Mushonga, Zimbabwe National Party.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> UNARMS, S-286-0003-15, Trouble with the Security Council, 1966; UNARMS, S-0883-0010-13, Transcript of BBC interview with U Thant, April 1966.



**The Odyssey of an historical comparative approach. Perks and misadventures of comparing the independence of Greece and Colombia.**

**Luis Alfredo De la Peña Jimenez**

**PhD researcher in History – University of Florence**

This text, written for this special academic event, more than an example of historiographical research work will be a reflection on the exercise or rather, the craft of history from the conditions, perspectives, and vicissitudes of a South American historian of the first decades of the XXI century in Europe, who tries to carry out a comparative historical analysis. The origin of my PhD project, provisionally titled "Birth of Nations, legacy of heroes. The processes of Independence of Colombia and Greece, the National Museums, and the construction of collective memory around them" is neither recent nor spontaneous. From the moment in which I finished my undergraduate degree in history and began to have contact with certain secondary sources on spaces and historical experiences that were assimilated to the national construction of my country, Colombia, I saw the abstract possibilities (which with the passage of time have become tangible) to analyze in a comparative way the period of the era of revolutions in the south of the Balkan peninsula and the north of the world. South American continent. In this order of ideas, the motivations and first hypotheses of this research appear that in summary consist of establishing a historiographic bridge that allows to expand the perspective of the historical analysis focused on the nation-state and to see the process of the post-Napoleonic revolutions as a global phenomenon, taking as points of support the independence of Colombia (1810-1819) and in the Greek revolution (1821-1830).

Whenever I have had the opportunity to talk about these two historical events and their possibilities of comparison in various academic spaces, conferences, and informally with professors and colleagues, the wake in the air or the generalized concern of despite sounding interesting and "plausible", because both events share a series of similarities: both are processes of independence that create an independent state after a colonial domination of almost 4 centuries by a Mediterranean power in decline for the nineteenth century. But with strong geographical, religious, linguistic, and cultural differences. Therefore, it is not clear how such a comparison is possible, how familiar the processes of national formation

in Greece and Colombia may become, or how absurd or coherent it is to think of a comparison at that global level. This question has been nourished over time, in which I have made a thorough approach to these two revolutions, in their historiographical projection and now in this doctoral project, in their tangible materialization through museum exhibitions and commemorations throughout 200 years of independent history of Colombia and Greece.<sup>1</sup>

The question will continue to generate concern and even surprise, essentially when looking for a tangible and direct link between the two revolutions to be compared, which remains the main mole of research. By researching the historical development of both events and knowing it in depth, their similar characteristics at the same time as their large divergent lines appear clearly and allow to establish a contribution to historiography with the connection of these two national entities during their first processes of modern state formation and in turn demonstrate the importance of their study at a local scale, regional and global.

### **More questions than answers.**

What is the most important reason for developing this comparative research exercise? What can contribute to both global and national historiography in Greece and Colombia and the historiographical current of public history a comparison between the possibilities and works of memory generated around the period of independence both in the Balkans and in South America? What are the practical possibilities of a theoretical-historiographical analysis of the experiences of collective memory construction in these two countries? are some of the questions that my dissertation will try to answer, taking into account the scope of the analysis itself, the limitations of time, space and resources that are available to generate this analysis and the possibilities of complementation in future works.

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<sup>1</sup> Some of The previous results of this comparison can be seen at: **De la Peña Luis**. "The Independence processes of Greece And Colombia: Topics and possibilities of comparison." *Global Histories: A Student Journal* 5.2 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.17169/GHSJ.2019.304>; **De la Peña Luis** "The Outside Revolutions: Wars and Military Change in the Independence Movements in Latin America and the Balkans, 1810–1830", in *Carnival Journal of the International Students of History Association* vol. XVIII–XIX (2018) p. 54–67

Obviously, doubts and concerns about the depth of this analysis, its relevance and its very vision have arisen from the moment of its formulation. Throughout my incipient academic career and after presenting and discussing my work in several countries in America and Europe, a documentary and analytical corpus has developed strong enough to develop research at this level. Cabe emphasize that whoever writes these lines is aware of the limitations of his own academic and research process, of the same conditions that his context and environment have imposed on him and that are particular to it, in addition to the fact that this dissertation is still being written in a pandemic context and who subscribes is an academic of the so-called global south, with the implications that these conditions entail (visas, passports, residence permits, epistemological difficulties, discrimination, lack of knowledge by colleagues and teachers of the basic context about the countries compared). The limitations to this work both theoretical and bureaucratic intellectuals as well as mental, economic and geographical factors are not sufficient reasons not to have the conviction and courage to carry out this research in the end.

### **Reflections and outcomes.**

The strongest reflection that this work aspires to generate is that there is a real possibility of building historiographical bridges that are not mediated from a dominant English- or French-speaking historiography and that it is filtered and established according to its own parameters and conditions. It is possible, because it is necessary, to write history of the "Age of Revolutions" from and for the peripheries, for those revolutions that have remained in the background but that have sufficient historical weight to be relevant and essential for the global understanding of this historical period.

Global history, *histoire croise* and connected history have suffered several blows after having conquered important ground within the discipline and the academic world during the last decades. But this does not mean that his approach and analysis is not already valid. Comparisons are still valuable, especially if they are raised from historical spaces that have not been so explored <sup>2</sup>outside themselves. The independence of Colombia and Greece is

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<sup>2</sup> For some developments on these debates, see: **Kocka**, Jürgen. "Comparison and beyond." *History and theory* 42.1 (2003): 39-44; **Levine** Philippe. "Is comparative history possible?." *History and Theory* 53.3 (2014): 331-347 and **Leikin** Julia. "From Comparative to Entangled Histories." *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 22.1 (2021): 173-182.

perhaps in each of these countries, the historical episode with greater literature and historiographical debates carried out, but outside its national context its relevance and value until relatively recently, is practically minimal.

Obviously, this is one of the vices of national historiographies and historiography in general, which, despite globalization and interconnectivity, continues to put the nation-state as the first and fundamental element of study. Therefore, it is essential to break these schemes and break them from the periphery, demonstrating that this debate and this historiography are not monolithic. Likewise, demonstrate that with the current conditions of connectivity and access to information these events can be integrated into a much broader and more integral discussion, without the need to be mediated by a previous academic sphere and based on the knowledge centers of the global north.

One of the plausible results of this research is to understand the main motives and tools used by the two countries analyzed, born in the first half of the nineteenth century to narrate, configure and justify their existence through cultural institutions configured as national museums, collections of a collective past, materialized in concrete objects. Objects that over time have had various political and ideological charges even though they now belong to a collective called a nation. In any case, the understanding and appreciation of these objects today has a character like that of a relic, turning the museum piece into a recipient of veneration and respect, but at the same time transforming it into a link between different regional and local identities that find in the objects of the museum a point in common.

The creation of a space for the conservation and exhibition of these objects could be considered as the starting point for the cult of memory that is synthesized through these same material elements. Such as the elaboration of some of the first products of the collective memory generated by the newly independent nations. A nation does not exist if it does not have a story to tell, a story that brings together the various identities that reside in it, and fundamentally, a history that is tangible and can be materialized in objects, whether these are the fragments of the vase of José Llorente, which gave rise to the brawls that would initiate the process of independence of Colombia on July 20, 1810, or the particular in confusing helmet of Theodoros Kolokotronis, one of the most distinguished

military heroes of the Greek Revolution of 1821. these two objects, to cite an example of each particular case, are found as fundamental pieces of the history collections of the national museums both in Colombia and in Greece and serve that mission of uniting a collective memory.

Now, after the process of celebration and commemoration of the two hundred years of independence of both Greece and Colombia, it is important to highlight in this section dedicated to the conclusions, the lessons that these commemoration processes leave in terms of public history, dissemination and historical memory. Being this, one of the sections of this research that continue in constant feedback and rewriting. This being one of the fundamental problems of research itself, it is known that in general, historians tend to take chronological distance from their objects of study in an attempt at objectivity and erudition, even if you are fully aware that the past began from the moment you finished writing (or reading) this sentence. In any case, it is important to keep in mind that in these times, where the past is in constant dispute and reconfiguration from the most diverse platforms, analyzing these processes fulfills a practical and theoretical purpose in the future, looking for ways to generate better exhibitions and better museographic discourses respectively, or at least that these are more integral, inclusive and with a greater democratic character.

In conclusion, this small exhibition of my research or my attempts to develop one, seek to shed light on how difficult it can be to try to connect tangibly these two revolutions. Taking into account that although the historiographical difficulties are quite and important, compared to the tangible difficulties subject to migration, swiftly access to information and the intersectional difficulties of this craft for someone who came to the periphery to study and research in the center(s) in a tremendously hierarchical and exclusive structure such as the University as an institution and especially History as an academic discipline, make the historiographical or documentary component look like the simplest part of the process. Dealing with tokenism disguised as diversity, with migratory discrimination, with unfulfilled academic promises and misunderstanding or in the worst of the cases the rampant and hurtful ignorance of peers and tutors, make finding motivation and dealing with all these issues something more complicated and demanding than facing the difficulties to connect or disconnect the case studies of my research.

## Workshop ‘Disconnected Histories’

9 June 2023

Florence, Università degli studi di Firenze/ European University Institute.

**Title: The Failed Treaties between the United States of America and the Italian States: On the Political Economy of Post-Independence International Relations (1776-1787)**

By Lucile Boucher, PhD Researcher (EUI)

*Italian states, together with the Mediterranean world in general, remain relatively marginalized in the narratives of early modern globalization. Nonetheless, and especially after the end of the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the Italian statesmen and others tried to develop global connections via trade – quite unsuccessfully so, but not so uninterestingly for historians. My thesis puts these commercial projects in their historical contexts of production, and investigates what these unsuccessful, missed or failed connections can tell us about the features and ideological assumptions on which relied the early modern globalization of exchanges.*

*This paper is part of a chapter on the attempts at developing diplomatic and commercial relations with the new Republic by Italian diplomats. It shows how focusing on failed connections reveals sometimes overlooked existing connections and how this approach offers engaging perspectives on how the actors conceived and made sense of these connections.*

The independence of the British north American colonies in 1783 brought favourable opportunities for trade. American commissioners were sent in Paris, eager to find new commercial partners now that the ex-colonies were freed from the British navigation acts. For the American political leaders as well as traders, the Italian states were the key to their successful commercial penetration of the Mediterranean. Thomas Jefferson joined John Adams and Benjamin Franklin in Paris in August 1784 to deal with the negotiations ‘for Amity and Commerce’ with the Europeans. Mentions of sporadic travels of Italian ships to America during the war appear in the Archives, even though no documentation related to these expeditions remain. On the other hand, the American presence in the Mediterranean prior to the nineteenth century has recently been documented.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Luca Codignola, “Relations between North America and the Italian Peninsula, 1763-1799: Tuscany, Genoa and Naples,” in *Rough Waters: American Involvement in the Mediterranean in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth*

## I. Thomas Jefferson and Italy: A Mediterranean project

Already in 1778, Independentist leaders expressed a vivid interest for the Mediterranean trade:

“The countries bordering on the Mediterranean I think will merit our earliest attention. They will be the important markets for our great commodities of fish (as Roman Catholics), wheat, tobacco and rice. The two last commodities particularly may be vended in any quantities in Turkey. [...] Emigrants too from the Mediterranean would be of much more value to our country in particular than from the more Northern countries.”<sup>2</sup>

More than half of the Powers designated to the Commissioners by the Congress' Commission in May 1784 were Mediterranean and among them Tuscany, the Two Sicilies, the Savoyard states, the Papal dominions, and the Republics of Venice and Genoa were explicitly cited.<sup>3</sup> From the declaration of independence in 1776 to the proclamation of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 the question of foreign trade was at the centre of the state-building process.<sup>4</sup> The political sphere was divided between partisans of the promptest re-establishment of connections with Great Britain while some leaders like Jefferson believed the U.S. should rather build an entirely new commercial network. However, if Jefferson showed a constant diplomatic activism, his ideas concerning the role of the state in regulating trade were at the opposite of interventionism.<sup>5</sup>

This early interest for the Mediterranean and Italy was induced by two Tuscan settlers in Virginia who befriended Thomas Jefferson in the 1770s: Charles Bellini, former officer of the Grand Duke of Tuscany's Treasure, and Filippo Mazzei (1730-1816), adviser of the Grand

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*Centuries*, eds. Silvia Marzagalli, James R. Sofka, and John J. McCusker, (St. John's, Nfld.: International Maritime Economic History Association, Research in Maritime History, no. 44, 2010), p. 25-42.

2 “From Thomas Jefferson to Richard Henry Lee, 30 August 1778,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0078>.

3 “Enclosure I: Commission for Negotiating Treaties of Amity and Commerce, 16 May 1784,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0214>.

4 It took for instance several years for the Congress to be entitled to rule foreign trade. Indeed, foreign trade provide a good view on how the young republic hesitated between centralization of powers and strict federal system. The Congress had no power to edict a federal policy, levy taxes or fund an army and navy. The first secretary for foreign affairs (1781-1783), Robert R. Livingston, was quite powerless and a real executive administration for foreign affairs slowly took shape under the secretary of John Jay (1783-1789). See the resolutions concerning foreign trade voted by the Congress in 1784: <https://www.loc.gov/item/90898088/>.

5 In 1787, Thomas Jefferson was contacted by a certain Jeudy de l'Hommande who claimed to have discovered a revolutionary way to preserve flours and wanted to “sell” his secret to the Americans. Jefferson answered that the American “policy is to leave their citizens free, neither restraining nor aiding them in their products” and that government intervention in matter of production led too many times to abuse.” See: “To Thomas Jefferson from Jeudy de l'Hommande, 31 May 1787,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0371> and “From Thomas Jefferson to Jeudy de l'Hommande, 9 August 1787,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0017>.

Duke, who was sent by the Congress to Italy during the war to raise funds and to test the waters for commercial activities.<sup>6</sup> Staying in Paris for several months before heading South, Mazzei became familiar with the Parisian foreign community and especially with Italian diplomats to whom he praised the potential of entering in commercial contacts with the (forthcoming) United States.<sup>7</sup> Mazzei paved the way for Jefferson's diplomatic mission in the Italian states. Before Jefferson's departure, Mazzei sent him a "Memorandum regarding Persons and Affairs in Paris" which greatly helped Jefferson's insertion in the political networks of the Parisian community.<sup>8</sup>

Jefferson was a privileged interlocutor whose role in collecting information was crucial in setting up commercial links between the American and the Italian markets. Antonio Giannini, an Italian settled in Virginia, sent Jefferson samples of cloth requested by a merchant of Lucca who was interested in opening a trading company in Virginia. In exchange, Antonio Giannini seemed to have been commissioned by Jefferson to send him seeds and plant samples.<sup>9</sup> In the same way, Jefferson helped set up connections in Philadelphia for Italian merchants via his acquaintance the Gouverneur Morris.<sup>10</sup> Between March and May 1787, Jefferson himself travelled in France and in northern Italy. His goals were to inspect the agricultural and manufactures' production in these countries in order to provide American merchants with technical and commercial information.<sup>11</sup> In Turin, he met with several Savoyard merchants and discuss the possibilities to establish trading companies between Italy and the U.S. He made very clear in his correspondence which role he could endorse in these business connections:

"Should you desire any further information, or to pass letters with certainty to any mercantile house in America, do me the favour to

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6 "From Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 21 August 1777," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0023>; "To Thomas Jefferson from Philip Mazzei, 18 December 1779-9 January 1780," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-03-02-0264>; "To Thomas Jefferson from Philip Mazzei, [27 November 1779]," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-03-02-0224>; "To Thomas Jefferson from Philip Mazzei, 8 April 1781," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-05-02-0477>.

7 He met there for instance Naples' ambassador Domenico Caraccioli, who had just been appointed Vice-Roy of Sicily and later became Prime Minister in 1786. "To Thomas Jefferson from Philip Mazzei, 3 May 1780," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-03-02-0438>.

8 "Philip Mazzei's Memoranda Regarding Persons and Affairs in Paris, [ca. July 1784]," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0292>. Among the names of persons who Jefferson should meet in Paris, the Chevalier d'Hénin (before he left for Venice) described as a member of the advisers' circle close to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Charles de Vergennes.

9 "To Thomas Jefferson from Antonio Giannini, 21 June 1786," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0561>.

10 "From Thomas Jefferson to Giovanni Fabbroni, 24 May 1789," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0149>.

11 "Notes of a Tour into the Southern Parts of France, &c., 3 March–10 June 1787," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0389>.

address yourselves to me at Paris, and I shall do whatever depends on me for promoting this object.”<sup>12</sup>

Entering the Mediterranean without a British flag meant that the Americans had, like the Italians, to deal with north African corsairs. Like the Italians, the Americans believed that the assurance of a reciprocal trade would avoid them the expense of tributes and protected their ships which were already being captured.<sup>13</sup> The situation worsened when the number of American captives in the Ottoman Regencies’ ports increased, even though a first treaty was signed with Morocco in 1787.<sup>14</sup> Advocating a commercial diplomacy based on reciprocal profits and free trade, the Americans thought to have great chances to meet the Italian promotion of neutrality and their interest into ending north African privateering. Directly aimed at meeting Italians’ expectations, the Americans even copied in their draft for a ‘model’ treaty an entire article from the League of Armed neutrality declaration and regarded such principles to “be considered now as the law of nations.”<sup>15</sup>

## II. The diplomatic phase with the Italian states, 1784-1786

In September 1784, Jefferson sent to the Prince of Caramanico, ambassador of the King of the Two Sicilies in Paris, and Luigi di Pio, his Secretary, an official invitation for the establishment of a commercial treaty as well as a list of products which could be exchanged.<sup>16</sup>

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12 “From Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Guide, 6 May 1787,” Founders Online, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0332>.

13 As early as 1784, an American captain found himself stuck in Genoa with his cargo, too afraid by the corsairs to sail back to New England: “To Benjamin Franklin from Joseph Rati, 21 June 1784,” Founders Online, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-42-02-0229>.

14 “From Thomas Jefferson to the Governor of Virginia, 9 August 1786,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0139> ; “To Thomas Jefferson from John Jay, 24 July 1787,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0542> and *Taher ben Abdelhack Fennish to American Peace Commissioners, English Translation of Letter Announcing Peace Treaty Between Morocco and the United States*. -06-28, 1786. Manuscript/Mixed Material, Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib002278/>. For the captives see “To Thomas Jefferson from Richard O’Bryen and Others, 8 June 1786,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0516> ; “To Thomas Jefferson from Richard O’Bryen, 28 April 1787,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0306> ; “To Thomas Jefferson from Richard O’Bryen, 25 September 1787,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0173> ; “To Thomas Jefferson from Richard O’Bryen, 13 June 1789,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0186>.

15 “Enclosure: Draught of a treaty of Amity and Commerce between — and the United states of America, 11 May 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0417> ; “From Thomas Jefferson to Burrill Carnes, 22 September 1787,” Founders Online, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0158>.

16 “American Commissioners to D’Aranda and Others, 22 September 1784,” Founders Online, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0320>. and ASN, Esteri, busta 4210, ASN, Esteri, Busta 4210, Progetto di un trattato di commercio con l’America, 1784-1784, Letter from di Pio to Naples, 28 September 1784; Letter from the Prince of Caramanico to Naples, October 1784.

During the following months, the project was examined by the Neapolitan administration in a procedure which shaped a pattern for how the King would be dealing with any commercial matter: having arrived via his Foreign Affairs Ministry or from the Ministry of War and Navy, it was discussed in the royal Privy council; the project was then sent to Ferdinando Galiani, preponderant magistrate of the *Supremo Magistrato di Commercio*, whose report should guide the answer to the King's interlocutors. This sequence was repeated several times until 1786.

At this early stage already, several problems arose. From the political point of view, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies could not agree to the signature of a commercial treaty with the United States before the Courts of France and Spain came to an agreement themselves. Indeed, Galiani was convinced that the Americans' pressing demands for commercial treaties suggested that the brand-new independent states were only seeking political legitimacy through international recognition.<sup>17</sup> In this regard, he advised the King to write to the Spanish court in order to inquire about their own negotiations with the American commissioners. The Neapolitan government was also not used to discussing possible treaties with emissaries without ever exchanging a single direct word with the sovereign American Congress, as this was the usual diplomatic way in Europe. It is also possibly for that reason that the Spanish Crown sent someone directly to Philadelphia, bypassing the American commissioners in Paris.<sup>18</sup>

In order to postpone the signature of any treaty with the United States, the King of Naples nonetheless invited American ships to trade in the Kingdom's ports and specifically in the free port of Messina where "they will have liberty to trade produce of their own country as well as goods of their own manufacture and those of other nations."<sup>19</sup> After all, the majority of Naples' commercial partners operated without a proper formal treaty as was the case for the French, Dutch, Spanish, and Italians. Other ties based on blood, or a long-shared history were sufficient to regulate their trade. A treaty was therefore deemed necessary only when the legal framework in which exchanges of goods and circulation of people needed to be clarified. As no such continuous exchanges and circulations were already happening between the two countries, such a treaty could not build on any reality.<sup>20</sup> On the American side, the signature of a treaty was essential since, before the proclamation of the Constitution in 1787 (and even after), the Congress was not able to rule on foreign trade questions except when formal treaties between

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17 ASN, Esteri, busta 4210, *Consulta* di Galiani, 24 October 1784 and *Consulta* di Galiani, 6th November 1784.

18 Idem, Letter from the Comte di Floridablanca to the Marchese della Sambuca, 12 July 1785.

19 Idem, Draft of a Letter to Luigi di Pio, 14 December 1784. A copy of Messina's '*édit d'affranchissement*' was transmitted to the American commissioners. See also "Luigi Pio to the American Commissioners, 22 January 1785," Founders Online, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-16-02-0294> Original letter in French, translated by the editors.

20 ASN, Esteri, busta 4210, Draft of a Letter "a Pio riservata", December 1784.

two sovereigns were ratified.<sup>21</sup> This means that without a treaty, each state was entitled to rule on trade, “and then one prohibits something that the other approves.”<sup>22</sup>

According to the Neapolitans, however, the signature of a treaty was also not relevant from a commercial point of view. Indeed, given the fragility of the Neapolitan navy, such a long-distance trade would be operated by American ships. Furthermore, half of the products figuring on the short list furnished by Jefferson was already arriving on the Neapolitan market via shorter and cheaper ways. For instance, tobacco, whose sale had been liberalized in the Kingdom, was thought to be the main product of interest for Neapolitans. However, it was easily found in the Ottoman Empire, and it was still unclear how much the loss of British imports would impact the Kingdom’s consumption. Reciprocally, Jefferson quoted American grain as a possible good to bring to Naples, when the Kingdom was one of the most prominent providers of grain in Europe. Altogether, northern America was interesting as a buyer of Neapolitan wines and oils so that allowing American ships to come and buy these goods in the Kingdom ports appeared sufficient.<sup>23</sup>

However, Neapolitan rulers did not entirely dismiss the possible conclusion of a treaty in the future. Indeed, the United States could soon provide the Kingdom with a crucial commercial advantage. American negotiations with France, Spain and Great Britain were expected to clarify the structures of exchanges in the Caribbean which were completely transformed by the war. If the United States were to be granted access to the colonial ports of the ‘West Indies,’ then a commercial treaty would allow Neapolitans to bypass colonial exclusive regulations and access much more interesting goods such as indigo, sugar or cotton.<sup>24</sup>

The same invitation was made by the Savoyard States who induced American ships to trade in the free port of Nice before any political agreement could be made.<sup>25</sup> The Republic of Venice, however, gave absolutely no answer to the American Commissioners’ openings.<sup>26</sup> With the Great Duchy of Tuscany, the negotiations seemed first promising as the Great Duke

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21 It took for instance several years for the Congress to be entitled to rule foreign trade. Indeed, foreign trade provide a good view on how the young republic hesitated between centralization of powers and strict federal system. The Congress had no power to edict a federal policy, levy taxes or fund an army and navy. The first secretary for foreign affairs (1781-1783), Robert R. Livingston, was quite powerless and a real executive administration for foreign affairs slowly took shape under the secretary of John Jay (1783-1789). See the resolutions concerning foreign trade voted by the Congress in 1784: <https://www.loc.gov/item/90898088/>.

22 ASN, Esteri, busta 4210, Letter from di Pio, 26 July 1785 (deciphered copy).

23 Idem, Note from the *Supremo Magistrato di Commercio*, October 1785.

24 Idem.

25 “De Scarnafis to the American Commissioners, 2 February 1785,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0461>

26 Their ambassador just assured the Americans that he sent their request to the Senate in September 1784: “Delfino to the American Commissioners, 27 September 1784,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0325>.

declared himself ready to receive the plan for a Treaty from the Commissioners.<sup>27</sup> This plan was achieved and sent before the end of 1784.<sup>28</sup> Drafts and counter-drafts then circulated between the American Commissioners and the Grand Duchy via Favi over 1785. The basis of the treaty was the principle of “the most favoured nation” which means that the Americans will enjoy the same benefits (access, duties, exemptions, etc.) as the current most favoured nation did in Tuscany and that the Tuscans will reciprocally enjoy the same benefits as the most favoured European nation in the U.S ports. This principle was absent from the ‘model’ treaty elaborated by the U.S and introduced by the Tuscan Duchy. In the end, the last 27-articles draft proposed by the American Commissioners proved to be a perfect hybrid between *Ancien régime* European standards and new idioms and political references brought by the revolutionaries, such as the term ‘citizens’ which mirrors the classical ‘subjects.’<sup>29</sup> At the end of 1785 the last draft sent by the Tuscan court remained, however, unanswered by the Commissioners.<sup>30</sup>

Jefferson formed bitter conclusions when his commission ended in 1786, as no treaty of any sort had been concluded with none of the Italian states:

“You ask in what state is our treaty with Naples? Congress gave powers to Mr. A[dams], Dr. F[ranklin] and myself to form treaties of alliance and commerce with every nation in Europe with whom it could be supposed we should have an intercourse of any sort. These powers were to continue two years. We offered to treat with all those nations. (...) Tuscany exchanged propositions backwards and forwards with us, but before they could be completed, our powers expired. (...) But all the other nations made professions of friendship and said they supposed a commerce could be carried on without a treaty.”<sup>31</sup>

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27 “Favi to the American Commissioners, 16 November 1784,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0385>.

28 “American Commissioners to Favi, 9 December 1784,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0404>.

29 “American Commissioners to Favi, with Observations on Treaty Project, 8 June 1785,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-08-02-0147>.

30 The last letter from Jefferson acknowledging the treaty project was very critical: “From Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 19 November 1785,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0032>.

31 “From Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael, 22 August 1786,” *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0203>.

# Lepanto – Faith, Otherness, and Community

*Gabriel Farrugia*

Faith, otherness, and community are at the heart of the living conditions at sea, considered as a theatre of religious galley warfare. These key words are also ways of emotionally perceiving the world in its material and metaphoric form, they represent early modern personhood, and what modern historians would consider as a form of micro spatiality, a way of feeling ‘global’ through thought rather than geography.<sup>1</sup> Monique Scheer argues in favour of emotions as a form of practice, seeing emotions as a way of doing in the world and not emotions as a form of inner possession.<sup>2</sup> In this context, she argues favourably about the Extended Mind Theory (EMT) and goes on to say that any lived experience is something one does with body and mind in the world.<sup>3</sup>

On the eve the galleys of Christianity set sail for Lepanto on 10<sup>th</sup> September 1571 the Franciscan Fra Lattantio preached a sermon presenting the sea as a place of transformation, and sin as a threat to life at sea. On board one of the vessels armed and part of the Ottoman fleet sailing for battle at Lepanto, was a possibly learned mariner who writes a collective invocation to Allah. From a theological perspective, the Catholic sermon and the Islamic invocation tell of a Faith that needs to be sustained by trials, but most importantly, that Faith is personified through the image of the ship. The sermon and the prayer highlight that the elements of a ship and of seafaring should make one reflect on: God’s providence, the troubles that attack the community of the Faithful, and the strength of personal conscience. The Catholic orator and Muslim sailor, provoke the senses by recalling through their words maritime scenes that invite the congregation to worship. Both writings stress on individual and collective Faith, aspects of community living that should reflect brotherhood at sea, but also elements of otherness that go against God. The use of the five outer senses supplemented by the so-called inner senses (memory, common sense, imagination, and estimative forces) of Classic origins and shared by Catholic and Muslim cultures alike, are evident in early modern church sermon rhetoric but also Islamic prayer.<sup>4</sup>

The gist of the sermon entitled; “Predica della Nave Christiana”, in the presence of Don Juan of Austria, the commander of the Catholic League, compares the Church to a galley. After addressing the prominent figures in the audience, the Franciscan Fra Lattantio presents a mental image of Christ as *nocchiero* (coxswain), master of the winds against the proud sea. He encourages his congregation to visualise how human bodily fragility, burdened by sickness and turbulence, is like a wrecked ship.<sup>5</sup> The Church, he cries, is also like a ship and is divided into

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<sup>1</sup> Christian G. De Vito and Anne Gerritsen, eds., *Micro-Spatial Histories of Global Labour* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018): 4.

<sup>2</sup> Monique Scheer, ‘Are Emotions A Kind Of Practice (And Is That What Makes Them Have A History)? A Bourdieuan Approach To Understanding Emotion’, *History and Theory* 51, no. 2 (May 2012): 193–220.

<sup>3</sup> Erika Kuijpers and Cornelis van der Haven, eds., *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 7. See also Monique Scheer, “Are Emotions A Kind Of Practice (And Is That What Makes Them Have A History)? A Bourdieuan Approach To Understanding Emotion,” *History and Theory* 51, no. 2 (May 2012): 193–220.

<sup>4</sup> Stephen Cummins and Max Stille, ‘Religious Emotions and Emotions in Religion: The Case of Sermons’, *Journal of Religious History* 45, no. 1 (March 2021): 3–24.

<sup>5</sup> BAV, Coll.Gen.booR.G.Teol.IV.2754(int.5), f2.

three parts just as the world is also divided into nature, law, and the Gospel. He persists on this image, elaborating further, that the Church, like the galley is narrow at both ends but wide in the middle and manned by the “timoniere - San Pietro, i marinai - i prelate, i soldati - gli angivoli, i vocatori - i dottori, i bombardieri - i predicatori. The equipment on board is also personified in this speech: Il timone - la fede, l’ancora - la speranza, le corde - la carita, le vele - le perseveranza, la arbore - la cognitione, i remi - le scritte, l’artiglieria - la parola di dio, lo sperone - la pacentia, l’aura - lo Spirito Santo.”<sup>6</sup> Faith at sea he preaches, conserves the body and the soul, hope brings comfort, charity motivates, and perseverance secures those at sea. He then reminds the knights, soldiers, and mariners present that Holy wisdom will always find a port, while the Holy Scripture comforts those in need at sea, and as a result, God’s word will bring joy. Patience, he says makes the voyage worthwhile for the Holy Spirit is found on the high seas. Fra Lattatio invites his congregation to ‘alzate gli occhi’ and see that the Virgin Mary was the North Star always fixed and giving direction.<sup>7</sup> After using such imagery in the imagination of those present, he reminds the congregation of the challenge ahead: “il Gran cane d’Oriente e gia usito fuori di suoi confini, naviga per i nostri mari, ci baia sulle porta”.<sup>8</sup> He explains to those present that the enemies of the Church are the waves that trouble it’s Faithful. He quotes the prophet David who asks why the enemies of God are always to be found at the borders of the world, going round in circles without an aim and in a frenzy. Fra Lattatio says: “D’Oriente sorgono i Turchi, da Occidente i Mori, da Mezzogiorno gli Arabi”.<sup>9</sup>

Sermons have been the subject of research in the history of emotions and are often discussed for the emotion words used to move a congregation in a given context. However, sermons are also beneficial to historians to understand the way historical actors might have applied the words heard to their life, hence emotions as a practice.<sup>10</sup> The words preached to the galley labourers in 1571 highlight that their activities at sea had universal consequences, and their efforts part of a universal struggle faced by a Universal, Catholic and Apostolic Church. I argue that such rhetoric evident in the Islamic prayer described below, gives a certain spatiality to the inner senses that are being activated as the separate congregations comprehended the oration and invocation through outer senses. Perhaps often overlooked is the Ottoman world of galley labourers in the struggle of 1571. A good example that may illustrate how the Islamic counterpart also felt some form of universal responsibility, is a late sixteenth-century Ottoman divination manual for mariners, found in the State archives of Paris. This volume is rich in timekeeping formulas, guides to foretelling the battle’s outcomes as well as an oration to Allah.

The invocation written by an unknown galley labourer, before a determinative naval struggle, possibly Lepanto, calls upon Allah and his saints and spirits of men of the hidden world from the time of Adam, to intervene and assist in the campaign ahead. The invocation is written in the plural, referring to a community of mariners and soldiers that form part of fleet. The first prayer is for the release of Muslim captives on board the enemy galleys they are about to encounter. The second prayer is for the “warriors be inundated with spoils and booty...and

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<sup>6</sup> BAV, Coll.Gen.booR.G.Teol.IV.2754(int.5), f4v-5r.

<sup>7</sup> BAV, Coll.Gen.booR.G.Teol.IV.2754(int.5), f6r.

<sup>8</sup> BAV, Coll.Gen.booR.G.Teol.IV.2754(int.5), f7r.

<sup>9</sup> BAV, Coll.Gen.booR.G.Teol.IV.2754(int.5), f6v.

<sup>10</sup> Cummins and Stille, ‘Religious Emotions and Emotions in Religion’, 16.

that God may facilitate their return to their homeland”. Thirdly, they pray to Allah to rid the ship from sickness, and to “protect our little ship from calamity or mistake, destroys the ill-bread infedels, and turns their flags upside down”.<sup>11</sup> The unknown mariner onboard writes for Allah to do so for the sake of Profet Noah. It is easy to understand Noah as a principle divine intervener for such mariners, believing in a sacred mission challenged by waters and infedels, but which vessel is manned by men of Faith. The prayer concludes by asking God’s mercy on the self-indulgent companions on board, that they may preserve their Faith till their final breath and “so that they may easily answer the questions by the two angels Munkar and Nakir”.<sup>12</sup>

What hints that at least in part this volume or ‘scrapbook’ dates from the battle of Lepanto is a shorted version of that naval encounter that ‘defeated and crushed’ the Ottoman galleys in 1571 by the same hand in the pages that follow the invocation. This volume also includes several prayers individuals may recite and perform for a vessel to be saved from natural calamities such at unfortunate winds, storms, and rough seas. In the case of rough seas, one was encouraged to write down a verse from the Quran, copy the verse on seven pieces of paper and throw them into the sea one by one. Magic manuals, charts, and small scraps of paper of a divinatory nature as well as prayers for protection and healing trinkets became quite a marker of the early modern traveller and equally diffused amongst Christian and Muslim travellers. The processes through which this knowledge or material culture was shared and passed hands within the seafaring community during voyages on galleys, can only be partially reconstructed. However, surviving evidence of such items and the documentation of their use that accompany them allows one to understand shared perspectives that have a direct relationship between the material and geographical, and the human and physical. Signs in the sky also seemed to bring confusion as to the possibility of victory on board the Catholic galleys. For example, as the vessels headed out of Messina a sort of meteor shower in the sky and a crescent moon, was interpreted by some as a bad omen. Other signs had also been documented before as is noted in the illustration below of the determinative conflict that took place in the same location as the naval encounter between Octavius’s ‘western’ fleet and Marc Antony’s ‘eastern’ fleet. On the top right-hand corner of this illustration, one notices a separate illustration explaining how a bright star on a cross surmounting a half crescent moon, had been seen over the Black Sea and interpreted as hope.

Archaeologists Harris and Flohr Sorensen argue that past sensorial experiences might be analysed by retrieving from sources possible references to (1) emotion words, (2) the networks established within spaces between people and material culture, (3) the awareness of the emotions of others, and (4) the mood that develops or is expected to develop by a group or community, when focused on the same event.<sup>13</sup> They name these stages as ‘the emotion’, the ‘affective field’, ‘attunement’ and ‘atmosphere’ respectively.<sup>14</sup> The three elements are necessary for an emotional atmosphere to develop, that ultimately create a collective experience of feelings. It is tempting to suggest that emotional atmospheres are the emotional

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<sup>11</sup> A Tunç Şen, “Manuscripts on the Battlefields: Early Modern Ottoman Subjects in the European Theatre of War and Their Textual Relations to the Supernatural in Their Fight for Survival,” n.d., 94-96.

<sup>12</sup> Translation of manuscript written in Turkish is provided by A Tunç Şen, in “Manuscripts on the Battlefields”.

<sup>13</sup> Joseph de Rivera, “Emotional Climate: Social Structure and Emotional Dynamics” in *International Review of Studies on Emotion*, 2, 197-218. Edited by K. T. Strongman (John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1992): 201-206.

<sup>14</sup> Oliver J.T. Harris and Tim Flohr Sørensen, ‘Rethinking Emotion and Material Culture’, *Archaeological Dialogues* 17, no. 2 (December 2010): 145–63.

regimes William Reddy is concerned about.<sup>15</sup> So far, their proposal has remained only theoretical and never properly adopted.<sup>16</sup> If one considers the above-mentioned sermon and invocation, a number of emotion words may be highlighted. The affective field could be derived from sources that describe the physical elements of such galleys, of which elements the Franciscan personifies some. This Muslim prayer and Catholic sermon were tools in renewing Faith and attuning the listeners to shared beliefs and ways of perceiving an experience through the use of culturally significant words, and names. The aim of attuning a community of sailors and warriors emotionally, though shared sensorial experiences such as listening to the sermons, viewing signs in the sky, or throwing prayers into the sea, helped to develop an atmosphere which would possibly have direct effects on the battle ahead against a common religious ‘other’. This method, I believe, would bring about conclusions on (1) how the spiritual formation galley labourers developed through sensory triggered emotional experiences, and (2) how personhood was expressed and negotiated in and through body and mind exposing aspects of Faith, otherness, and community at sea. Remembering words heard in such sermons or pondering on the prayers recited at sea, might have caused moments of emotional suffering and emotional liberty that effected their relationship with their physical surroundings, the emotional attunement with other labourers, and ultimately the atmosphere in a given space, transforming and challenging the emotional perceptions of the world around them that conditioned individuals to undergo emotional journeys that navigated between moral straits of life and death.




Figure: Illustration of the battle of Lepanto, with notes on the outcome of the battle with marginal notes on previous determinative signs in the cosmos. BAV R.G.Miscell.III.806(int 7).

<sup>15</sup> Rob Boddice, *The History of Emotions, Historical Approaches* (Manchester University Press, 2018), 70.

<sup>16</sup> Sarah Randles, ‘Materiality’. In Susan Broomhall, ed., *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction* (London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017): 19.